Optimal sizing of energy communities with fair revenue sharing and exit clauses: value, role and business model of aggregators and users

Fioriti, Davide and Frangioni, Antornio and Poli, Davide (2021) Optimal sizing of energy communities with fair revenue sharing and exit clauses: value, role and business model of aggregators and users. Technical Report del Dipartimento di Informatica . University of Pisa, Pisa, IT. (Submitted)

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Abstract

Energy communities (ECs) are essential policy tools to meet the Energy Transition goals, as they can promote renewable energy sources, demand side management, demand response and citizen participation in energy matters. However, to fully unleash their potential, their design and scheduling requires a coordinated technical operation that the community itself may be ill-equipped to manage, in particular in view of the mutual technical and legal constraints ensuing from a coordinated design. Aggregators and Energy Service COmpanies (ESCOs) can perform this support role, but only provided that their goals are aligned to those of the community, not to incur in the agency problem. In this study, we propose a business model for aggregators of ECs, and its corresponding technical optimization problem, taking into account all crucial aspects: i) alleviating the risk of the agency problem, ii) fairly distributing the reward awarded to the EC, iii) estimating the fair payment for the aggregator services, and iv) defining appropriate exit clauses that rule what happens when a user leaves the EC. A detailed mathematical model is derived and discussed, employing several fair and theoretically-consistent reward distribution schemes, some of which are, to the best of our knowledge, proposed here for the first time. A case study is developed to quantify the value of the aggregator and compare the coordinated solution provided by the aggregator with non-coordinated configurations, numerically illustrating the impact of the reward distribution schemes. The results show that, in the case study, the aggregator enables reducing costs by 16% with respect to a baseline solution, and enables reaching 52.5% renewable share and about 46% self/shared consumption, whereas these same numbers are only 28-35% for the non-coordinated case. Our results suggest that the aggregator fair retribution is around 16-24% the added benefit produced with respect to the non-coordinated solution, and that stable reward distribution schemes such as Shapley/Core or Nucleolus are recommended. Moreover, the results highlight the unwanted effect that some non-cooperative ECs may have an added benefit without providing any positive effect to the power system. Our work lays the foundations for future studies on business models of aggregators for ECs and provides a methodology and preliminary results that can help policy makers and developers in tailoring national-level policies and market-offerings.

Item Type:	Book
Uncontrolled Keywords:	Mixed Integer Linear Programming (MILP), hybrid Renewable/Citizenship Energy Community system (REC/CEC), coalition game theory, cooperative game, Energy Service COmpany (ESCO), Peak power management
Subjects:	Area09 - Ingegneria industriale e dell'informazione > ING-IND/33 - Sistemi elettrici per l'energia Area01 - Scienze matematiche e informatiche > MAT/09 - Ricerca operativa
Divisions:	Dipartimenti (from 2013) > DIPARTIMENTO DI INFORMATICA Dipartimenti (from 2013) > DIPARTIMENTO DI INGEGNERIA DELL'ENERGIA, DEI SISTEMI, DEL TERRITORIO E DELLE COSTRUZIONI
Depositing User:	Prof. Antonio Frangioni
Date Deposited:	14 Jun 2021 07:28
Last Modified:	17 May 2022 06:49
URI:	http://eprints.adm.unipi.it/id/eprint/2400

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